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We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive con-
tractual relationships. We consider economies where agents are privately informed
over the probability distribution of their endowments, and trade to insure against
this uncertainty. As in Prescott-Townsend (1984), we model exclusivity by im-
posing the incentive compatibility constraints directly on the agents’ consumption
possibility set. In this set-up, we identify the externality associated with the pres-
ence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality. We consider
a structure of markets which allows to internalize such externality, for which we
show that competitive equilibria exist and are incentive e¢cient. On the other
hand, when this ’expanded’ set of markets required to internalize such external-
ity does not exist, competitive equilibria are shown to be, typically, not incentive
e¢cient, but to satisfy an appropriately de…ned notion of third best e¢ciency. Ap-
propriate versions of the second welfare theorem for these two market structures
are also established.
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We study competitive economies with adverse selection and fully exclusive contractual
relationships. We consider pure exchange economies where agents have private informa-
tion regarding the probability distribution of their endowments; uncertainty is purely
idiosyncratic.
Many di¤erent equilibrium concepts have been introduced to study adverse selection
economies. The standard strategic analysis of such economies, due to Rothschild-Stiglitz
(1976), considers Nash equilibria of a game in which insurance companies choose the
contracts they issue, and the competitive aspect of the market is captured by the free
entry of insurance companies. Such equilibrium concept does not perform too well:
equilibria in pure strategies do not exist for robust examples (Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)),
while equilibria in mixed strategies exist (Dasgupta-Maskin (1986)) but, in this set-up,
are of di¢cult interpretation. Even when equilibria in pure strategies do exist, it is not
clear that the way the game is modelled is appropriate for such markets, since it does
not allow for dynamic reactions to new contract o¤ers (Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979)).
Moreover, equilibria are not robust to ‘minor’ perturbations of the extensive form of the
game (Hellwig (1983)).
This paper studies instead Walrasian equilibrium concepts, where agents and in-
surance companies act as price takers in competitive markets for contracts. Contracts
provide insurance to the agents against the realization of their individual uncertainty;
since uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic, we can argue that agents, though not informa-
tionally small, are ’small’ as far as the level of their trades is concerned, so that their
price-taking behavior is justi…ed. Moreover, insurance …rms are also price-taker and
endowed with a constant return to scale technology. As a consequence, the problem of
dynamic reactions to new contract o¤ers does not arise since at equilibrium there a price
is quoted for all possible contracts and …rms make zero pro…ts for any choice of contracts
o¤ered.
We assume that agents’ trades can be fully monitored, so that exclusive contractual
relationships are possible (as in Rothschild and Stiglitz). In such situation, the agents’
private information is the only ’friction’ to the operation of markets.1 We intend therefore
to address the following questions. What is the structure of markets, and what are the
properties of allocations attainable as competitive equilibria? And in particular, are
competitive equilibria incentive e¢cient, i.e., do competitive markets allow, in this set-
up, to attain e¢cient allocations, subject to the only constraint imposed by the agents’
private information?
1Exclusivity is clearly a strong assumption. It provides however an important benchmark as we
argued, and is the case typically considered in contract theory. The properties of competitive equi-
libria when this condition is violated, or only non-exclusive contractual relationships are available, are
investigated in Bisin-Gottardi (1999).
2The possibility of implementing exclusive contracts can also be viewed as the possi-
bility of implementing fully non-linear price schedules, where the price of each contract
depends on the level of trades in the same contract as well as in all other markets. Evi-
dently, with fully non-linear price schedules, incentive e¢cient allocations can be easily
decentralized as competitive equilibria. However, a large set of other, ine¢cient equilib-
ria also exists. On the face of this fact, a possible route is to consider indeed a model
with fully non-linear price schedules (or where the dimension of possible contracts is
expanded along an additional dimension, the quantity traded), introducing ’re…nements’
to restrict admissible equilibrium prices, and in particular the prices of contracts not
traded at equilibrium. This route has been explored by Gale (1992), (1999) and Dubey,
Geanakoplos, Shubik (1995) for economies similar to the one considered here.
On the other hand, we follow here Prescott-Townsend (1984) in modelling exclu-
sive contractual relationships by restricting the consumption possibility set to include
only incentive compatible allocations (prices are then linear over this restricted domain):
allocations which are not incentive compatible are excluded from the consumption pos-
sibility set. Contractual relationships are then exclusive in the sense that any incentive
compatible trade is available to the agents, and cannot be ’broken’ by trading multiple
contracts. It is important to notice that it is always possible to replace the restriction
to incentive compatible allocations by an appropriately de…ned non-linear price schedule
for contracts (indeed ensuring that incentive compatibility is satis…ed). Thus the struc-
ture of markets and prices considered by Prescott and Townsend can also be viewed as
a particular form of re…nement on the form of admissible non-linear price schedules for
contracts, meant to capture the fact that the only role of the non-linearity is to ensure
incentive compatibility.
Prescott-Townsend (1984) study both economies with moral hazard and with ad-
verse selection. While for moral hazard economies they prove existence and constrained
versions of the …rst and second theorems of welfare economics, their method does not
succeed in analyzing adverse selection economies. They conclude (p. 7) that “a di¢culty
emerges, however, in attempting tosecure standard existence and optimality theorems for
all economies consistent with the general structure”, which encompasses both economies
moral hazard and adverse selection.
In this paper we observe …rst that, with adverse selection, when exclusive contracts
are available, an externality arises and identify it as a special form of consumption ex-
ternality. On this basis, we consider an (expanded) structure of markets which allows to
internalize this externality, and propose an equilibrium notion which successfully repli-
cates, for adverse selection economies, the results that Prescott-Townsend (1984),(1984-
bis) obtain for moral hazard economies: existence of an equilibrium and (incentive)
constrained versions of the …rst and second theorem of welfare economics. We call such
equilibria ALPT, for Arrow-Lindahl-Prescott-Townsend. ALPT equilibria require the
existence of markets for property rights, which allow the internalization of the exter-
nality in the agents’ choice problem induced by adverse selection, in the same way as
3Arrow-Lindahl equilibria do for standard consumption externalities and public goods.
In economies with asymmetric information, the whole set of trades each agent makes
are related; it is so desirable - in fact needed for incentive e¢ciency - that they be part of
a single contract (i.e., that contracts are exclusive). In addition, with adverse selection,
the contracts available to each type of agent are not independent of the contracts chosen
by other types. Thus, incentive e¢ciency requires in this case that also the contracts
traded by the di¤erent types of agents be part of a single bundle of contracts. Beyond the
abstraction, the structure of markets in ALPT equilibria is indeed meant to capture such
further bundling of contracts, and hence to allow for the possibility that some degree of
cross-subsidization among contracts takes place at equilibrium.
Having identi…ed adverse selection with a form of consumption externality, we also
study the equilibria of adverse selection economies when the markets required to internal-
ize such externality are not present (we call such equilibria, EPT, for Prescott-Townsend
with externalities). We show that EPT equilibria exist and characterize their properties.
Evidently, EPT are not, typically, incentive e¢cient. However, EPT equilibria satisfy an
appropriately de…ned notion of third best e¢ciency (for which a version of the second
welfare theorem also holds). In this case, the contract traded by each type is treated
as a separate contract, independent of the other contracts, and no cross-subsidization
takes place at equilibrium. For the economies considered in this paper, the set of EPT
equilibria coincides with the set of competitive equilibria with non-linear prices, when
an appropriate re…nement is imposed on admissible price schedules.
The analysis will be developed for a simple insurance economy with adverse selection
as the one considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). This constitutes, as we argued,
a very important test case for any equilibrium notion for adverse selection economies.
In addition, by exploiting the simple structure of the economy, we will be able to clearly
illustrate the features and to provide a complete characterization of the various notions of
competitive equilibria which will be considered. The extension of the analysis to general
adverse selection economies poses various technical problems which we intend to address
in another paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, the structure of the
economy considered is presented, and incentive e¢cient allocations are characterized. In
the following section, …rst EPT equilibria and then ALPT equilibria are presented, their
existence established and their e¢ciency properties characterized.
2. The Economy
Consider a competitive economy with adverse selection. There is a continuum of agents
of two di¤erent types, b and g. Let »
b denote the fraction of agents of type b and »
g the
fraction of agents of type g in the population.
There is a single consumption good. Uncertainty enters the economy via the level of
4the agents’ endowment and is purely idiosyncratic. There are two possible states, H;L,
for every individual, and his endowment when H (resp. L) is realized is !H (resp. !L).
Let ¼i
s be the probability that individual state s, s 2 S ´ fH;Lg, is realized for an
agent of type i, i 2 fg;bg (it will sometimes be convenient to simply write ¼i for ¼i
H and
1 ¡ ¼i for ¼i
L): These random variables are independently distributed across all agents
(and identically distributed across agents of the same type).
With no loss of generality, let !L < !H (state H is then the good state), and 0 <
¼b < ¼g < 1 (type b is the ‘high-risk’ type, and type g the ’low-risk’).
The preferences of each agent are described by von Neumann-Morgernstern utility
function, with (type independent) utility index u : R+ ! R+; de…ned over consumption




s); for i 2 fg;bg:
Each agent is privately informed about his type.
We assume:
Assumption 1. Endowments are strictly positive, for all agents: !L;!H > 0: Pref-
erences are strictly monotonic, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and
limx!0u0(x) = 1:
Under the above assumptions on agents’ preferences, the single crossing property
holds: the indi¤erence curves of the two agents’ types intersect at most in one point.
While this property is exploited in some parts of the following analysis, for many results
the following, weaker, property, requiring that preferences are su¢ciently diverse across







where DUi (x) denotes the gradient of Ui (x), has full row rank.
Note that the economy is essentially the same as the insurance economy with adverse
selection considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
3. Incentive E¢cient Allocations
Let xi ´ (xi
H;xi
L); i 2 (g;b):


















where the purely idiosyncratic nature of the uncertainty and the Law of Large Numbers
have been used to take the sum of the excess demand for the commodity contingent on
each individual state, weighted by its probability.
5Since agents’ types are only privately observable, additional constraints, incentive






































s) · 0 (3.3)
Remark 1. As shown by Prescott and Townsend (1984) (see, also, Cole (1986)), in
the presence of asymmetric information it may be desirable to expand the consumption
space so as to allow for random allocations of contingent commodities, or lotteries over
consumption bundles. This is not the case for our simple economy, as allocations involv-
ing nondegenerate lotteries are always suboptimal (see the proof of Proposition 1 in the
Appendix and, also, the proof of Lemma 3). To keep the notation simpler, de…nitions
are then stated for the case of non random allocations..
De…nition 1. An allocation fxb;xgg is incentive e¢cient if it is feasible, incentive
compatible (i.e., satis…es ((3.1), (3.2), (3.3)) and there does not exist another alloca-





Ug (^ xg) > Ug (^ xg), with at least one inequality being strict.
For the simple adverse selection economy under consideration, we can provide a
complete characterization of the set of incentive e¢cient allocations:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, all (symmetric) incentive e¢cient allocations are
of one of the following forms:
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6Essentially the same result appears already in Prescott and Townsend (1984)2. We
present, for completeness, a slightly di¤erent proof in the Appendix.
Remark 2. The above result shows that at an incentive e¢cient allocation at least one
of the two agents’ types is fully insured (has a deterministic consumption bundle). In
particular, there is an incentive e¢cient allocation where both types are fully insured
(case (i) above); this allocation is also Pareto e¢cient, or the incentive constraints do
not bind. In case (ii), the agents of type b are fully insured, while the type g agents are
partially insured (only the second of the two incentive constraints, (3.3), is binding). On
the other hand, in case (iii), agents of type g are fully insured, while the b agents are
overinsured (the …rst incentive constraint only, (3.2), binds).
Even though, as we already argued, lotteries over consumption bundles are allowed, the
characterization obtained in Proposition 1 reveals that, in the economy under consider-
ation, they are never optimal.
4. Competitive Equilibria
We consider in this paper the case where agents’ trades are fully observable, so that
exclusive contracts, or equivalently fully non-linear price schedules, can be implemented.
In the simple economy considered, contracts provide insurance against the realization of
the agents’ individual uncertainty; the set of possible contracts is then the set (R2
+) of
consumption levels in each of the two individual states. Following Prescott-Townsend
(1984), we will model exclusivity of contracts by imposing incentive compatibility directly
as a constraint on the set of admissible contracts each agent can trade. Evidently, with
private information all contracts traded in the economy have to be incentive compatible;
in this sense, to exclude contracts which fail to be incentive compatible is not a real
restriction. On the other hand, the fact that any point in the set of incentive compatible
allocations constitutes a contract the agent can trade implicitly requires an exclusivity
condition, to ensure that the agent is unable to engage in additional trades which would
lead him to a possible violation of incentive compatibility.
A budget set with linear prices de…ned over such restricted consumption set is equiv-
alent, as already argued in the Introduction, to a budget set with (appropriately chosen)
nonlinear prices de…ned over the (unrestricted) consumption set. Thus the restriction
to incentive compatible allocations can be viewed as a way of modelling agents facing
non-linear pricing schedules, when the only role of the non-linearity is to ensure incentive
compatibility.
When private information is of the moral hazard type (e.g. hidden action), incen-
tive compatibility concerns di¤erent choices (unobservable e¤ort levels) the agent can
2See also Jerez (1999) for the analysis of incentive e¢cient allocations of a more general class of
economies.
7make, and the choice problem of each agent can be analyzed separately from the one
of other agents. Thus, there is no ambiguity in this case: to impose an incentive com-
patibility restriction simply amounts to excluding the pairs of consumption bundles and
e¤ort where the e¤ort level is not the one agents would choose at that level of con-
sumption. Equivalently, it corresponds to having prices which vary non-linearly with the
level of consumption to re‡ect the di¤erent choices of e¤ort made by the agent at each
level of consumption (see Kocherlakota (1998), and Magill-Quinzii (1998)). As shown
by Prescott and Townsend (1984), competitive equilibria are incentive e¢cient in this
case.3 It is also possible to show that the same set of competitive equilibrium allocations
obtained by Prescott and Townsend obtains with non-linear prices, when essentially any
type of re…nement on admissible prices is imposed.
On the other hand, with adverse selection, since contracts’ payo¤ depends on the
agents’ type, which is unobservable, the contract traded by each type cannot be con-
sidered separately from the ones traded by the other types. This has some important
consequences. The same contract, when entered by di¤erent types is, in e¤ect, a di¤er-
ent contract; however, all such contracts get aggregated together in the market clearing
conditions and the total payo¤ depends on the composition of trades by the di¤erent
types. An externality arises so in the feasibility conditions. In addition, as we see from
(3.2),(3.3), the incentive compatibility constraints relate now the consumption levels of
di¤erent types, thus an externality arises here too.
The main focus of Prescott and Townsend (1984) is on the …rst form of externality.
They argue in fact that the source of the di¢culties with adverse selection is that ”agents
with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading
enter the economy-wide resource constraints in a heterogeneous way” (p. 7). We will
show here that, if the incentive compatibility constraints given in (3.2),(3.3) is imposed
on the consumption set,4 contracts traded by di¤erent types can be treated as separate
contracts, traded at (possibly) di¤erent prices. Thus the feasibility problem described
above no longer arises,5 and we are only left with the externality induced by the presence
of the incentive compatibility constraints in the agents’ consumption set.
These constraints imply that, when an agent, say type b; increases his consumption,
this has an e¤ect on the possible values of consumption of agents of type g, for whom it
may now be easier (or more di¢cult, according to which incentive constraint is binding),
to satisfy these constraints. Thus the admissible levels of consumption for one type
3See, however, Bennardo-Chiappori (1998).
4This possibility is brie‡y discussed at the end of the (unpublished, extended version of) Prescott
and Townsend (1984); each type of agent is then asked to choose the consumption allocation for all
types, so that a con‡ict typically arises, and such equilibria fail to exist.
5On the other hand, when exclusive contracts are not available, so that we are unable to separate
agents’ of di¤erent types on the basis of the di¤erent level of their trades, the feasibility problem
described above cannot be avoided. Bisin and Gottardi (1999) have shown that, indeed because of this
problem, with linear prices competitive equilibria may fail to exist.
8depend on the level of consumption of the other type; there is so an externality in the
speci…cation of each agent’s consumption possibility set.
Once the presence and the nature of the externality in adverse selection economies
with exclusive contracts is clearly identi…ed, the model can be analyzed as other com-
petitive models with externalities in consumption.
We …rst consider the notion of EPT equilibrium, where each agent takes as given the
level of consumption of the other types, i.e., the externality is not internalized.
Next, the notion of ALPT equilibrium is introduced. In an ALPT equilibrium markets
for consumption rights, for both the agent ’s own consumption and the consumption of
agents of the other type, are present. These markets allow to internalize the externality
the consumption of each agent imposes, via the incentive compatibility constraints, on
the consumption level of the other type.
4.1. EPT Equilibria
There are separate contingent markets where each type of agent can trade at linear
prices, possibly di¤erent across types, the commodity contingent on the realization of
the agent’s individual uncertainty; qi
s is then the unit price at which each agent of type
i 2 fg;bg can trade the commodity for delivery in his individual state s 2 fH;Lg: The set
of admissible trades of each type is restricted by the incentive compatibility constraints,
where his consumption level appears together with the consumption level chosen by the
other type, which is taken as given.
We are allowing prices to depend on the agents’ type, even though this is only pri-
vately observed. As we will see, the presence of incentive compatibility in the consump-
tion set ensures that the di¤erentiation of prices according to the agents’ type is incentive
compatible.
The choice problem of each agent of type g has then the following form. The agent





+, specifying his level of consumption
in the agent’s two possible individual states, subject to the budget constraint and the

























































9The incentive constraints require that agent g prefers (at least weakly) his own bundle to
the one chosen by b and similarly that b prefers his bundle to the one g is choosing. for
himself. These constraints (in particular the second one) imply that g cannot increase
his level of consumption beyond a certain level, without a breakdown of the separation
between the market where he and the other type can trade. The admissible choices of
consumption of type g are then a¤ected by the consumption level of agents of the other
type, xb ´ (xb
H;xb
L); and this is taken as given here.
The level of consumption of agents of type b has no direct e¤ect on the agent g’s
utility. It only enters the agent’s problem via its e¤ect on the incentive compatibility
constraints. Thus the model is, formally, a model with an externality in the consumption
set. Thus we have an externality in the consumption space which is not internalized.
The choice problem of agents of type b; (P b
EPT) is symmetrically de…ned, now taking
xg as given.
In addition to consumers we introduce …rms. Firms ’pool’ contracts of the same type,
i.e., construct aggregates of the commodity contingent on the same individual state and
type. The Law of Large Numbers provides then, in the economy under consideration (as
already noticed), a mechanism - or a technology - for transforming aggregates of the com-
modity contingent on di¤erent individual states and types. Thus …rms are characterized
by the following constant returns to scale technology:















The …rms’ problem is then the choice of a vector y of the commodity contingent on
the agents’ types and individual states y, lying in the set Y (i.e., which can be generated
by pooling contracts of the same type and transforming them according to the Law of
















Remark 3. The …rms’ choice of y can also be viewed as the choice of the contract to
o¤er the agents (like insurance …rms in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), but here …rms
are price-takers). Even though the set of possible contracts considered by …rms (Y ) is
very large and contains all contracts that budget balance, since at equilibrium contracts
o¤ered have to equal demand, and agents’ demand is subject to incentive compatibility,
this ensures that only incentive compatible contracts are o¤ered at equilibrium. Thus we
can also interpret the presence of the incentive compatibility constraints in the agents’
10consumption set, rather than a constraint ’self-imposed’ by agents, as a constraint on
the set of contracts …rms would ever consider o¤ering (see Jerez (1999) for a discussion
of the consequences of imposing the incentive constraints directly on the …rms - rather
than on consumers).
Let V g(qg;xb) denote the utility attained by type g at a solution of problem (P
g
EPT),
for given xb;qg ´ [qg
s]s2S. Let then V g;b(qb;xg) be the maximal utility an agent of type g
could reach by trading at the prices qb ´ [qb
s]s2S, o¤ered to agents of type b, i.e., obtained




























































taking xg as given.
By a perfectly symmetric argument we can de…ne V b(qb;xb); V b;g(qg;xb):
De…nition 2. An EPT is given by an allocation fxb;xgg, a production vector y; and a
price vector q such that:
(i) xi solves the agent’s optimization problem (Pi
EPT); at (qi;xj); for i 6= j;i;j 2 fg;bg;







s ¡ !s) · y
i
s; i 2 fg;bg;s 2 S (4.1)







i); for i 6= j;i;j 2 fg;bg
Condition (iv) requires that, faced with prices qg and qb, agents of type g prefer
to trade at prices qg and type b prefers to trade at qb. The next Lemma shows that
such condition is in fact redundant (given, in particular, the presence of the incentive
compatibility constraints in the speci…cation of the agents’ admissible trades in (Pi
EPT)).
11Lemma 1. If fxg;xbg;q satisfy condition (i) of De…nition 2, then condition (iv) of Def-
inition 2 is also satis…ed.
Proof. Take a solution xg of (P
g





V g;b(qb;xg) is obtained by maximizing the utility of type g at the price qb subject to,



















Hence V g ¸ V g;b. A symmetric argument holds for b
The following result can then be immediately derived from the …rst order conditions
of the …rms’ choice problem:





s; i 2 fg;bg;s 2 S (4.2)
On this basis, we are able to completely characterize the EPT equilibria of the econ-
omy under consideration: the only EPT equilibrium of the economy is the Rothschild
and Stiglitz separating candidate equilibrium, where type b is fully insured, at fair prices.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1 there exists a unique EPT competitive equilib-
rium, given by a price vector q satisfying (4.2), a production plan y satisfying (4.1), and
a consumption allocation fxg;xbg such that:
i. xb
L = xb
H = (1 ¡ ¼b)!L + ¼b!H := x;
ii. xg is obtained as a solution of (P
g
EPT) at xb; q:
Proof. By Lemma 2, qi
s = ¼i
s for all i;s: At these prices, the …rms’ optimal choice is
any y 2 Y ; thus y can be picked so as to satisfy (4.1). It can be readily checked that
xb as speci…ed above is a solution of (P b
EPT) at xg;q. Since, by Lemma 1, condition (iv)
of De…nition 2 is also satis…ed, we obtain that fxg;xb;y;qg indeed constitutes an EPT
equilibrium.
At such equilibrium the incentive constraint of type b, (3.3), holds as equality, while
the other incentive constraint, (3.2), is not binding. Also, it is immediate to see there
are no other EPT equilibrium allocations in the subset of the commodity space where
the incentive constraint of type g, (3.2), is not binding.
We will show that no EPT equilibrium allocation exists, with ‘fair’ prices, in which
the incentive constraint of the agents of type b is not binding. In this case in fact, the
solution of (P
g





H = (1 ¡ ¼
g)!L + ¼
g!H;
12but then there can be no vector xb satisfying both the budget constraint and the incentive
compatibility for the agents of type b; (3.3).
Finally, to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium, it remains to show that no EPT
equilibrium exists in the subset of the commodity space where both incentive constraints,
(3.3) and (3.2), hold as equality. Since, for the economy under consideration, as we
noticed, the single crossing property holds, the two incentive constraints can both be
binding only if xb = xg = x: But then x must satisfy the budget equation both at prices
¼b and at prices ¼g, and at least one of them - as long as x 6= ! - as inequality. Suppose it
is the one of type g,
P
s2S ¼g
s(xs¡!s) < 0; then - it can be readily checked - there exists
another bundle ~ x; which is also budget feasible at ¼g, satis…es incentive compatibility,
and is strictly preferred by g. So x cannot be an EPT equilibrium allocation. A similar
argument also holds when x = !:
Remark 4. To gain some further intuition on the reasons why the Rothschild-Stiglitz
separating candidate equilibrium is the only EPT equilibrium, let us consider the other
candidate equilibrium in Rothschild and Stiglitz, the ’pooling allocation’ (described at
point i. of Proposition 1). Why can’t this ever be an EPT equilibrium? The formal
argument, given in the proof shows that at such allocation, if prices are fair, agents of
type g would bene…t by modifying their choice; moreover, in this case the allocation
violates b’s budget equation. On the other hand, if prices were not fair, and in particular
if qg = qb so that the pooling allocation can be feasible for both types, …rms would
have a pro…table deviation. Prices are di¤erent from probabilities so that if, for instance
q
g
L < ¼g, qb
L > ¼b; …rms could achieve a (unboundedly large) positive pro…t by buying
commodity (g;L) and selling (b;L). Equivalently we can say that …rms can make positive
pro…ts by increasing the number of contracts they would like to sell to the g types, and
reducing the contracts sold to the b types (the presence of the incentive compatibility
constraints in the agents’ budget set ensures that this is always possible), or to ’break’
the ’pooling’ by introducing some separation, as indeed was the case in the argument
proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz.
We know from Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) (see also Proposition 1) that, for an open
set of economies, the separating candidate equilibrium is not incentive e¢cient. The
characterization of EPT equilibria obtained in Proposition 2 then also reveals that the
…rst welfare theorem does not hold, that EPT equilibria may not be incentive e¢cient.
This should not come as a surprise, given the fact that there is an externality which is
not internalized by the structure of markets considered here.
It is useful however to examine more closely what is the precise source of the ine¢-
ciency. As shown by Lemma 2, at an EPT equilibrium the prices of contracts traded by
each type are always fair. Thus at equilibrium there is never cross-subsidization across
types: each contract traded by one type satis…es a separate zero pro…t condition. We
13show next that not only such lack of cross-subsidization is clearly responsible for the
possible ine¢ciency of EPT equilibria, but, in the economy considered here, this is in
fact the only source of ine¢ciency: EPT equilibrium allocations are e¢cient within the
restricted subset of allocations which are incentive e¢cient and satisfy an additional no
cross-subsidization condition across types. Thus the following third best version of the
…rst welfare theorem holds:
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, all EPTequilibriumallocations are e¢cient within
the restricted set of feasible allocations which are incentive compatible and, in addition,






s ¡ !s) = 0; i 2 fg;bg (4.3)
Proof. If, at a solution of the problem of maximizing a weighted average of the agents’
utility subject to (3.3), (3.2), and (4.3) both incentive compatibility constraints hold
as equalities, under the assumptions made on agents’ preferences (in particular, by the
single crossing property), we must have xg = xb: But then (4.3) implies xg = xb = !.
On the other hand, if only one of the two incentive constraints is binding, say the
one for type b ((3.3)), then the optimal xb is simply obtained by maximizing Ub(xb) over
(4.3); thus it will always be at the full insurance point xb
H = xb
L on (4.3). The level
of xg is then determined by maximizing Ug(xg) subject to (4.3) and (3.3), taking xb as
given at the full insurance level determined before. It is immediate to see that the pair
(xb;xg) we obtain is the separating candidate equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz. If
we apply a symmetric argument when (3.2) is the only constraint binding, we …nd that
no solution exists in this case (when xg is at the full insurance level on (4.3), no value
exists for xb which also satis…es (4.3) and (3.2)). The result then follows by observing
that the allocation at the separating candidate equilibrium is always preferred by both
agents to autarchy..
On the other hand, a second welfare theorem result holds for the present structure of
markets: any incentive e¢cient consumption allocation can be decentralized as an EPT
equilibrium with transfers (possibly dependent on the state but not the agents’ type).
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, for any incentive e¢cient consumption allocation











0; and such that (xb;xg) is an EPT equilibrium allocation for the economy under con-
sideration when each agent receives a transfer (tH;tL):
Proof. Let (xb;xg) be an arbitrary incentive e¢cient allocation. By Lemma 2, at an
EPT equilibrium, prices of contingent commodities are necessarily ’fair’. If we consider
then the budget equations going through xb and xg at prices, respectively, ¼b and ¼g,
14they will intersect at a single point; call it !0 := (!0
L;!0
H). Since (xb;xg) satis…es the


































Letting ts = !0
s ¡ !s; (4.4) also implies that the transfers (tH;tL) are feasible.
We show next that (xb;xg) is the (unique in fact) EPT equilibrium consumption
allocation of the economy with endowments !0 := (!0
L;!0
H). Suppose not, i.e., there
exists another consumption bundle, say ^ xg for agent g, which also satis…es the incentive
compatibility constraints (at xb); is budget feasible (
P
s(^ xg
s ¡ !0) · 0); and is strictly

























thus, by (4.4), (^ xg;xb) is also feasible, incentive compatible and it Pareto dominates
(xg;xb); a contradiction.
Remark 5. It is interesting to compare EPT equilibria with the competitive equilibria
we obtain if incentive compatibility is not imposed on the consumption set but prices
of contracts are allowed to be arbitrary non-linear maps. In this case, the separat-
ing candidate equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz is the only equilibrium which sur-
vives the imposition of a re…nement on admissible equilibrium price schedules, in the
spirit of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) stability criterion, as in Gale (1992) and Dubey-
Geanakoplos-Shubik (1995). Thus, in the set-up under consideration, the separating
candidate equilibrium is a robust prediction of di¤erent Walrasian equilibrium concepts.
It is interesting to notice that this is an equilibrium also when the strategic analysis of
Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) found non-existence.
4.2. ALPT Equilibria
In the de…nition of EPT equilibria, the consumption set of each agent is restricted by the
set of incentive compatibility constraints which relate the level of his consumption to the
consumption level of the agents of the other type. This fact generates, as we noticed, an
externality in consumption. To internalize such externality, we introduce here markets for
rights to the other agents’ consumption, as in the model proposed by Arrow (1969) and
Lindahl (1919) for general economies with externalities and public goods. We will then
refer to competitive equilibria as Arrow-Lindahl - Prescott-Townsend (ALPT) equilibria.
The commodity space of every agent is then expanded so as to have ‘complete mar-
kets’ in property rights. Each agent, say agent b has access to markets for property rights
in his own consumption and in consumption of the other type, g. He consumes the rights
in his consumption only; these rights can be directly transformed into consumption goods
and enter then directly the agent’s utility. However, to be able to consume such rights
agent b must also hold the appropriate amount of rights for g’s consumption, so as to
15ensure that incentive compatibility is satis…ed; the rights for g enter then only indirectly
b’s utility. Similarly, agents of type g have access to markets for rights in their own
and the other agents’ consumption, and their allocation is also constrained by incentive
compatibility.
Note that in such formulation of the commodity space, each agent’s consumption is
independent of the other agents’ choices, since incentive compatibility relates the choice
by the same agent of rights over his own and the other type’s consumption. As a
consequence an externality in consumption no longer arises here. Let x
j
i;s denote agents’
i allocation of rights to consumption of agents j, in state s, for i; j 2 fg;bg, s 2 S. The
index appearing as a subscript then indicates the type of the agent who is buying the
right, while the index appearing as a superscript indicates the type of agent who is the
’object’ of the choice (i.e. the agent for whom the rights to consumption are purchased).




s2S describes then the amount of rights purchased by agent of
type i, where xi
i;s denote rights to the agent’s own consumption in state s, while x
j
i;s are
rights to the consumption of agents of other types j 6= i.
As for EPT equilibria, good and bad types trade in separate markets; prices (here
for consumption rights as well as contingent commodities) may depend then on the type
of the agent. At equilibrium we will show that the incentive compatibility of such price
di¤erentiation is satis…ed.
Agent g’s problem has the following form (the de…nition of b’s problem, (P b
ALPT);


























































































In the budget constraint, the endowment of contingent commodities of agents of
type g is evaluated at the prices fqg
sgs2S 2 R2
+, while the price of the agents’ rights for
consumption is pg = fpb
g;s;pg
g;sgs2S 2 R4. In such formulation, the agent is required to
sell his entire endowment of commodities, and to buy with the revenue rights to his -
and the other agents’ - entire consumption.6
6This condition will ensure that the agents’ budget set has a non-empty interior at all prices. See
below for a further discussion of the role of this formulation.
16Note that no restriction is imposed in general on the price vector pg. On the other
hand, the price qg of the contingent commodities is always non-negative. In general,
free disposal is not allowed for property rights, while it is allowed for the contingent
consumption goods.
As before, to show that at equilibrium this di¤erentiation of markets according to the
agents’ type is incentive compatible, it is convenient to introduce the following notation.
Let V g(pg;qg) denote the utility level agent g can achieve at a solution of problem
(P
g
ALPT). Let then V g;b(pb;qb;xb) be the maximal utility an agent of type g could achieve





































































































where the last constraint describes the incentive compatibility condition with respect to
the other agents operating in that market for the type b agents.
The terms V b(pb;qb) and V b;g(pg;qg;xg) are then symmetrically de…ned.
As standard, the supply of property rights is modelled by introducing …rms - denoted
type I …rms - who can transform commodities into property rights for commodities.





















s; 8s 2 S; i;j 2 fg;bg
¾
The technology allows the transformation of any amount of contingent commodities
(contingent on any agent’s type and (idiosyncratic) state s) into the same amount of
rights for consumption of the same contingent commodities for consumers of all types.





b;sgs2S denotes the - per capita - supply by the …rms
of rights for consumption of consumers of type b; and rb;I := frb;I
s gs2S is the vector of
17the contingent commodities (of type b agents) used as input to produce such rights (also
on a per capita basis). Let yI
g and rg;I be de…ned symmetrically; then rI ´ (ri;I)i2fg;bg;
yI ´ (yI
i)i2fg;bg. The technology requires the consistency among the amounts of rights














i ¡ qi ¢ ri;I¢
.
The same …rms as in the EPT model - denoted here type II …rms - are also present:
they purchase from consumers of all types an amount of contingent commodities which is







be the (per capita) input of contingent commodities purchased by consumers of each type
i; and yII ´ fyg;II
s ;yb;II





















s ) · 0g
These …rms choose then
¡
yII;rII¢









Remark 6. In economies with adverse selection, as we noticed, the contracts available
to each type of agent are not independent of the contracts chosen by other types; as
a consequence, some cross-subsidization across contracts may be desirable. Once this
possibility is allowed, in the strategic approach - as argued by Wilson (1977) and Ri-
ley (1979) - the relationship between the contracts traded questions the sense in which
pro…table deviations consisting in contracts o¤ered only to one type of agents could be
considered feasible per-se, without taking into account the change in the other agents’
trades generated as a consequence. To capture this fact, the strategic model of Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) has been extended to allow for possible sequences of reactions
and counter-reactions by …rms o¤ering contracts (see also Hellwig (1983)); within this
approach, a more explicit attempt at modelling the possibility of ’bundling’ of contracts
(and hence of cross-subsidization across contracts), can be found in Miyazaki (1977).
Beyond the abstraction of the formalization, the structure of markets in ALPT equi-
libria is set to capture the fact that contracts traded by di¤erent types can be bundled
together and hence to allow for the possibility of cross-subsidization. Not only all con-
tracts traded by a single agent are bundled in a single, exclusive, contract to enhance
incentives (as already the case in EPT equilibria), but also the contracts traded by di¤er-
ent types are now bundled together. In this way, the relationship between these contracts
can be properly internalized, and some types may be willing to pay a subsidy to relax the
incentive compatibility constraints. The role of the trading of property rights, and of the
speci…c formulation of the technology of …rms, is simply to model the fact that traders
18(in particular …rms o¤ering contracts) take into account the presence of a relationship
between the contracts traded by agents of di¤erent types.
Within the competitive approach followed here, at equilibrium all possible contracts
are priced and all contracts which are not traded are not pro…table. The pricing structure
implies that, to o¤er a contract to one type, a subsidy may be needed to ensure that the
other type is not willing to switch to the new contract; prices then ensure the feasibility
of contracts proposed and, in a sense, can be viewed as taking into account the chain of
possible reactions and counter-reactions identi…ed by Wilson and Riley (paying a subsidy
may so be necessary for the feasibility of the contract proposed). One may argue that the
equilibrium we are considering is vulnerable to a free-riding problem. While a contract
which breaks an equilibrium with cross-subsidization by taking away all, say, the g type
agents, for the reasons above, may violate feasibility, if o¤ered only to a small subset of
the g agents, it would be a feasible deviation. These agents would in fact free ride on
the subsidy paid by the rest of the agents of their type to ensure that feasibility holds.
In this case though a similar problem arises, as we still need to prevent the majority of
the g agents from switching to the new contract.
Since, as we argued, strategic analysis of competition in economies with adverse selec-
tion incur in several di¢culties, we do not have a satisfactory game-theoretic foundation
for the equilibrium concept proposed, ALPT. Still, the arguments in this remark aim at
showing that ALPT equilibria should not be viewed as a purely normative concept.
De…nition 3. An ALPT equilibrium is a collection of prices (pi;qi)i2fg;bg; consumption
and production vectors (xi)i2fg;bg; yI;rI;yII;rII; such that:
- xi is a solution of the agents’ maximization problem (P AL








solves the pro…t maximization problem of …rms of type II at prices (qi)i2fg;bg;






i;s; 8s 2 S; i;j 2 fg;bg








i!s; 8s 2 S; i 2 fg;bg





j;xj); i 6= j 2 fg;bg
19Remark 7. The market clearing conditions stated above require that - even though the
agents’ choice problem is typically not convex - all agents of the same type i make the







which is induced by an allocation of property rights
which satis…es such market clearing conditions will be feasible and incentive compatible.
On the other hand, if agents of the same type choose di¤erent bundles of property rights,
applying the market clearing condition to the average demand of rights (i.e., requiring
this to be the same across all types) does not ensure the incentive compatibility of the
induced consumption allocation.
Thus the traditional way of overcoming non-convexities by exploiting the presence of a
continuum of agents cannot be followed here, as we have to show that all the possibly
di¤erent choices made by agents of one type are the same across types. This consti-
tutes the main di¢culty faced in the existence argument, also with respect to the other
problems discussed in the next Remark.
Remark 8. The equilibriumconcept consideredhere, ALPT, is an extension toeconomies
with adverse section of the notion of Arrow-Lindahl equilibria for economies with exter-
nalities in consumption. In the present framework, as we noticed, the externality arises
in the de…nition of the agents’ consumption set; this is in fact restricted by the incentive
compatibility constraints, where the consumption level of the agents of the other type
enters. The particular form of the externality and the speci…cation of the consumption
set generate however various problems:
- the agents’ feasible choice set may not be convex (it is known in fact that the set of
allocations satisfying incentive compatibility is typically not convex). As a consequence
agents’ demand may fail to be upper-hemicontinuous;
- the agents’ budget set may not be compact (as negative prices are also allowed);
- the boundary behavior property of demand may fail (since the rights for the other
type’s consumption do not directly enter the agent’s utility);
- local nonsatiation may fail. Under the assumption that the agents’ utility functions
are strictly monotone we can easily see that global nonsatiation holds: for any vec-




i;s; 8s 2 S; i;j 2 fg;bg (so that the incentive compatibility constraints are
trivially satis…ed), and is su¢ciently large that the agent would strictly prefer xi to ¹ xi.
The same argument does not apply though if we restrict attention to an arbitrary small
neighborhood of ¹ xi, in which case it may not be possible to increase, locally, the level of
the agent’s own consumption without violating the incentive compatibility constraints
(see the example on p. 9 in Hammond (1989)).
We show next that, for the economy under consideration, the di¢culties described
above can be overcome and existence of an ALPT equilibrium established:
20Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1, an ALPT equilibrium always exists.
We show in particular that a competitive equilibrium exists where the price of the
rights for b’s consumption paid by g is strictly positive, while the price of the rights for
g paid by b is zero.
Proof. The existence results for Arrow-Lindahl equilibria are not applicable, as we
argued in the above Remarks, to the economy under consideration. The proof is orga-
nized as follows. We …rst show that the problem of …nding an ALPT equilibrium can
be reduced to the problem of …nding a set of prices (pi;qi)i2fg;bg such that the level of
consumer i’s demand for the rights to j 6= i’s consumption at those prices is the same
as the demand of consumer j for rights to his own consumption (Step 1). We then show
how the di¢culties concerning the behavior of agents’ demand mentioned in Remark
8 can be overcome, in particular that local nonsatiation holds and that demand is up-
perhemicontinuous (Step 2). In the next step we show that boundary behavior holds
and that, even though the agents’ choice problem fails to be convex, their demand is
single-valued over the restricted price domain we consider; existence of an equilibrium
price vector then follows by a standard argument (Step 3). Finally, we show that the
incentive compatibility of price di¤erentiation is also satis…ed (Step 4).
Step 1. Consider the pro…t maximization problem of …rms of type I: Given the
presence of constant returns to scale, for a solution to exist the following equalities,
ensuring that pro…ts are not positive for all, and zero for some, admissible production












i; 8s 2 S;i 2 fg;bg (4.7)





Similarly, for a solution of the pro…t maximization problem of the type II …rms












0 2 S; i 2 fg;bg (4.8)









7Strictly speaking, the second equality may also hold as inequality if the price vector q has some zero
component.
21Note that …rms’ and consumers’ demand is homogenous of degree 0 in (pi;qi)i2I: We
normalize prices in terms of contingent commodity (1;1); it is then convenient to set
q1
1 = ¼1





s; 8i 2 fg;bg; s 2 S (4.9)
If we premultiply by »
i the budget constraint of agents of type i, and sum then these






















On the basis of the above, to …nd a competitive equilibrium it su¢ces to …nd a set
of prices (pi;qi)i2fg;bg satisfying (4.7) and (4.9) such that the level of consumers’ demand





j;s;8i;j 2 fg;bg; s 2 S (4.11)
i.e., the demand of rights for all agents’ consumption has to be the same across all types.
To see this, note that, at all prices (pi;qi)i2fg;bg satisfying (4.7), the supply of property
rights by …rms of type I is such that, if (4.11) holds, the market for property rights
clears. Furthermore, using (4.11), (4.7), (4.9), the equilibrium condition for property
rights and the properties of the demand of contingent commodities by type I …rms to







i!s) · 0. Thus, given
the properties of the supply of contingent commodities by type II …rms at prices (4.9),
we see that rI is such that the market for contingent commodities clears too.
Let P be the set of property rights’ prices which satisfy the above conditions: P ´
f(pi)i2fg;bg 2 R8 : (pi)i2fg;bg satis…es (4.7) when (qi)i2fg;bg is given by (4.9)g.




















s; s 2 S (4.13)
for some ¯ 2 [0;1]. We will then show the existence of a competitive equilibrium when




(pi)i2fg;bg 2 P : pi satisfy (4.12-4.13)
ª
½ P:
8In particular, these conditions restrict prices of property rights to be non-negative. For more general
economies however, we may not be able to show that competitive equilibria exist under such restriction.
22The set P+ is convex and compact. The elements of this restricted price domain are
simply identi…ed by the parameter ¯ 2 [0;1]:
Consider then the following ’truncated’ sets of individual consumption levels XM ´











feasible set of the agent i’s choice problem (Pi
ALPT), when consumption is restricted to
lie in (XM)
4; is non-empty, compact, for i 2 fg;bg. Moreover, under Assumption 1,
we can show that the budget set has a non-empty interior, for all fpigi2fg;bg 2 P+ and
(qi)i2fg;bg satisfying (4.9).9 Consider in fact an agent of an arbitrary type i. Since ! À 0;
for all pi we can …nd a vector xi such that xi
i;s = x
j
i;s for all s 2 S, j 2 fg;bg; so that




Under Assumption 1 local nonsatiation also holds. Let ¹ xi be an arbitrary allocation
of rights which satis…es the incentive constraints appearing in (P i
ALPT). Di¤erentiating
i’s utility and the incentive constraints with respect to xi; we see that it is always
possible to …nd an in…nitesimal change of xi; at ¹ xi; which improves i ’s utility while
satisfying all incentive constraints, provided the …rst row of the following matrix is















Condition (2.1), implied by our assumption on preferences, ensures that this condition
is always satis…ed.
By a similar argument, we can also show that, for any point in the budget set which
satis…es incentive compatibility, there exists, in an arbitrarily small neighborhood, an-
other point which lies in the interior of the budget set. By di¤erentiating the equations
de…ning the budget set and incentive compatibility, we see that this is true if there exists


































9The requirement that each agent of type i sells all of his endowment (at a price qi); and buys rights
for consumption (at pi) plays a crucial role here. If agents could retain their own endowment while
simply choosing their net trades (at pi); their budget set would not have a nonempty interior at all
prices. In this case we can …nd robust examples where equilibria fail to exist; see the discussion after
the proof of Proposition 7.









s!s and for the submatrix of (4.14) de…ned by the rows associated with those incentive compatibility
constraints which hold as equality at xi:
23is negative, while all its other elements are non-negative. For all price vectors pi which
are components of a vector (pi)i2fg;bg 2 P+, this condition always holds.
Let xi(¯) denote the solution of problem (Pi
ALPT), for i 2 fg;bg; when xi is restricted
to lie in (XM)
4, prices of rights are restricted to lie in the set P+, and commodity prices
satisfy (4.9); the agents’ demand correspondence can thus be written simply in terms
of ¯. The properties of the agents’ choice problem we established above, and the con-
tinuity of the agents’ utility functions imply that, for every i; xi(¯) is non-empty and
upper-hemicontinuous for all ¯ 2 [0;1]. It may not be convex-valued though, as argued
in Remark 8, and boundary behavior also needs to be established.
Step 3. We now show that when (pi)i2fg;bg 2 P+; and q satis…es (4.9), boundary behav-
ior holds and the demand correspondence is single-valued, so that an ALPT equilibrium
exists.11
At prices pb which satisfy (4.12), evidently, agents of type b always choose bundles of
















The smaller is ¯, the higher is the subsidy agents of type b receive, and the higher is
their consumption.
Moreover, we show next that also the type g agents, facing prices pg as in (4.12),
always choose bundles where the agents of type b are fully insured. Three possible cases
are possible according to whether only the …rst (4.5), only the second,-(4.6), or both
incentive constraints hold as equalities. Examine …rst the case where both constraints
hold as equalities; by the single crossing property, we have xg
g = xb
g. Suppose the claim
is not valid, i.e., say xb
g;H > xb
g;L and consider the alternative choice of rights for b:
^ xb

















, while keeping unchanged the
choice of rights for g: The cost of this bundle is strictly lower than the cost of xg; at
prices as in (4.12); also, the incentive constraint of b; (4.6), is obviously still satis…ed, as
equality, while the other incentive constraint, (4.5), holds as an inequality. By choosing
this alternative bundle, agent g can then achieve the same utility level as at xg with a
lower expenditure; by local nonsatiation we get so a contradiction. A perfectly symmetric
argument holds in the case x
g
g;H < xb




Next, consider the possibility that only the incentive constraint of b; (4.6), holds
as equality; to …nd the solution of (P
g
ALPT) in this case, at prices pb as in (4.12), it
11The presence of a continuum of agents of each type in our economy could allow us to ’convexify’
demand and show that, at some price, the average demand of each type satis…es the equilibrium condition
(4.11). If, however, the ’convexi…ed’ demand is di¤erent from the original demand (i.e., if agents of the
same type make di¤erent choices at these prices), it would not follow that demand is exactly equal across
types and hence, as argued in Remark 7, we cannot guarantee that the induced consumption allocation
is also incentive compatible.
24su¢ces to look at the …rst order conditions of the problem where only the constraint
(4.6) is imposed. In this simpler problem, the optimal level of rights for b’s consumption,
(xb
g;s)s2fH;Lg must be such as to minimize the amount paid for such rights to attain a
given utility level of utility of the agents of type b; and the solution of such expenditure
minimization problem clearly has the property that xb
g;L = xb
g;H.
Finally, we observe that when, as in (4.12), fpb
g;sgs2fH;Lg > 0, it is never optimal for
the type g agents to choose bundles of consumption rights where only their own incentive
constraint, (4.5), is satis…ed as equality (as in such case they could always increase their
utility by reducing fxb
g;sgs2fH;Lg while still satisfying the incentive constraints). Thus the
last case to be considered never arises at a solution, completing the proof of the claimed
property of g’ demand.















Agents of type g face fair prices for their own consumption. Also, for ¯ ! 1, agents
of type g face prices for the rights to agent b’s consumption converging to 0, and hence
they choose: i) rights to their own consumption which in the limit support the full




g;H = (¼g!H + (1 ¡ ¼g)!L); and ii) rights
to b’s consumption, xb
g;s; s 2 S, which in the limit satisfy incentive compatibility with














If ¯ ! 0, on the other hand, agents of type g face positive prices for the rights to


























We show, …nally, that type g’s demand correspondence is single-valued for all ¯:
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 1, (xg(¯)) is single valued for all ¯ 2 [0;1].
Proof. We proceed as follows. We …rst expand the commodity space to include all
lotteries over consumption allocations. The problem which de…nes the demand of agent
g is then convex. Hence his demand is convex-valued for any ¯ 2 [0;1]. We then exploit
the …rst order conditions of agent g to show that his optimal choice is only given by
degenerate lotteries. This implies, since the demand correspondence is convex-valued,
that it is also single valued.
25Let [¢(XM)] denote the space of probability measures over the (compact) set XM,
endowed with the weak* topology12. When lotteries are also allowed, the optimization
problem of each agent of type g consists in the choice of [¹i
g;s] 2 [¢(XM)], for i 2 fg;bg,












































































The set of admissible choices in (P
g
ALPT;lot) is convex, as it is de…ned by linear in-
equalities. In addition, it is compact, since it is a closed subset of the set [¢(XM)]4,
which is compact as is de…ned by a …nite product of measures on the compact set XM;
it is non-empty, since it includes the degenerate lottery concentrated on the endowment
point, for each type.
Evidently, this set contains the admissible set of (P
g
ALPT):
The linearity of the objective function, together with the convexity, compactness
and non-emptiness of the set of admissible choices, ensure that a solution of problem
(P
g
ALPT;lot) exists (see Luenberger (1969), Section 8).
To show that a solution of problem (P
g
ALPT;lot) always obtains at a degenerate lottery,
when (pi)i2fg;bg 2 P+; and qg satis…es (4.9), it su¢ces to look at the …rst order conditions
of the problem. Let ½ denote the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, and
¸g and ¸b the Lagrange multipliers, respectively, of the …rst and the second incentive
compatibility constraint. The …rst order condition with respect to, e.g., ¹b
g;L(:), can then





g) ¡ ¸b(1 ¡ ¼
b)
¢




12The product space [¢(XM)]4 is then endowed with the corresponding product topology.
13Note that we are restricting our attention to the case of ex post randomization, as lotteries - lying
in [¢(XM)]4, rather than, more generally, in ¢[(XM)4] - are conditional on the realization of the
uncertainty. This is only for simplicity and, since our only aim is to prove that the agents’ choice is
concentrated on degenerate lotteries, it entails no loss of generality.
14Lotteries over consumption bundles are priced by the average amount of commodities they use.
26for any h(x) such that
R
XM dh(x) = 0 and ¹b
g;L(x) + h(x) ¸ 0. Since such condition
must hold for all h(x), it implies
£¡
¸g(1 ¡ ¼
g) ¡ ¸b(1 ¡ ¼
b)
¢




But, ¸g; ¸b ¸ 0, with at most one strict inequality; and ½ > 0. It follows that (4.17)
has at most a unique solution in x for all ¯ 2 [0;1].15 As a consequence, at any solution,
¹b
g;L(:) has all its mass concentrated on the values x 2 XM such that equation (4.17) is
satis…ed.
A similar argument holds for ¹b
g;H(:), and ¹g
g;s(:), for s 2 S.
This implies that agent g’s demand is a continuous function. Since b faces a zero price
for the property rights for g, his problem is unconstrained by the incentive compatibility
constraints; thus his demand for rights for his own consumption is also a continuous
function. Hence, by the argument at the beginning of this Step, an intermediate value
of ¯ 2 [0;1] exists which satis…es (4.15) and constitutes then, as we argued, an ALPT
equilibrium.
Step 4. To complete the proof it only remains to show that incentive compatibility of
price di¤erentiation also holds. This is immediate, given the way in which V ij(pj;qj;xj)
is constructed.
We show next that the structure of markets considered here indeed allows to solve
the problem of decentralizing incentive e¢cient allocations:
Proposition 6. All ALPT equilibria are incentive e¢cient.
Proof. The proof is quite standard. Suppose not, i.e. there exists a feasible, incentive
compatible allocation (^ xb; ^ xg) which Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation (xb
b;xg
g):




















































































































!)) maximizes the pro…ts of type II …rms at prices q:
At the ALPT equilibrium we constructed in the proof of Proposition 5, agents of





!s) > 0. The following question then arises: is the presence of some level of cross-
subsidization an intrinsic feature of ALPT equilibria? In particular, is the Rothschild
and Stiglitz separating candidate equilibrium, which involves no cross-subsidization and
is the unique EPT equilibrium of this economy, also an ALPT equilibrium ? Clearly
for the economies for which this allocation is not incentive e¢cient (an open set of
economies, as shown in Proposition 1) it cannot be an ALPT equilibrium, since this
would contradict the e¢ciency property of ALPT equilibria, shown in Proposition 6.
But even for those economies for which the Rothschild and Stiglitz separating candidate
equilibrium is incentive e¢cient, it is not an ALPT equilibrium as can be easily seen
from our construction.16
We must notice though that our de…nition of ALPT equilibrium implicitly relies on a
particular distribution of the endowments of property rights: each agent of type i 2 fg;bg
is required to sell his entire endowment of contingent commodities at prices qi and can
then use this revenue to buy rights for consumption at prices pi. Alternatively we could
have assumed that agents have to sell only a fraction ® of their endowment at prices qi.
By a straightforward extension of the argument in the proof of Propositions 5 and 6,
for any ® 2 (0;1] we can …nd an ALPT equilibrium of this kind and such equilibria are
always incentive e¢cient,. (This is not so for ® = 0, since in this case the budget set of
agents of type b does not have a non-empty interior for all prices p 2 P+ (see footnote
9).) Moreover, since at the constructed equilibrium pb
b · ¼b; the lower is ® the lower is
the subsidy to the type b agents. We can thus take the parameter ® to capture di¤erent
distributions of the endowment of property rights across agents of the two types.
Let us denote by ¯(®) the equilibrium value of ¯ associated to ®: The next proposition
reveals an important property of ALPT equilibria and in particular of the level of cross-
subsidization which obtains at equilibrium. As we let ® tend to 0, the sequence of ALPT
equilibrium allocations xi(¯(®);®) (recall that xg(¯(®);®) = xb(¯(®);®)) obtained by
applying the argument in the proof of Proposition 5 converges to the incentive e¢cient
allocation x characterized by the minimum level of subsidization from agents of type g
to agents of type b:
16For the separating candidate equilibrium to be an ALPT equilibrium we must have in fact ¯ = 1,






28More formally, x is obtained as a solution of the problemofmaximizing Ug(xg) subject
to the resource feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), and




s ¡ !s) ¸ 0, i.e., that b is not subsidizing g. It
is immediate to see, given the characterization of incentive e¢cient allocations derived
in Proposition 1, that x coincides with the Rothschild and Stiglitz separating candidate





s ¡ !s) ¸ 0 is not binding) given by the incentive e¢cient allocation
at which b‘s welfare is minimal.
Thus when ® approaches 0, or the distribution of rights is the least favorable to the
type b agents, the equilibrium is given by the incentive e¢cient allocation x where the
subsidy to the b agents is minimal. It is interesting to observe that x is also the unique
allocation in the core as de…ned by Marimon (1988).
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1, lim®!0xi(¯(®);®) = x.
Proof. .
At any ALPT equilibria we consider, prices p lie in P+, and qi satisfy (4.9), for any
i 2 fg;bg, by construction. Moreover the incentive constraints are not binding for the











where at the numerator of the term on the right hand side we have the expression of
the agents’ income ®
P
s qb
s! + (1 ¡ ®)
P
s;i pi
b;s! when they sell a fraction ® of their




Since both sequences xi(¯(®);®); and ¯(®) lie in compact sets, they admit convergent
subsequences; let ^ x; ^ ¯ be their limit.









s!s: If ^ ¯, the limit of ¯(®); is strictly positive, the value of the subsidy
converges to 0 so that xb clearly converges to x (equal to the Rothschild and Stiglitz
separating candidate equilibrium in this case).
On the other hand, if ^ ¯ = 0, the problem of agents of type g, (P
g
ALPT), in the limit,
for ® = ¯ = 0; reduces to the problem of maximizing Ug(xg) subject to the resource
feasibility and incentive constraints (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), whose solution is x: The limit
value of the subsidy to agents of type b is in this case positive or zero (but cannot be
negative since is it strictly positive for all ® > 0).
The proof of Proposition 7 shows that, for the economies in which the Rothschild
and Stiglitz separating candidate equilibrium allocation is incentive e¢cient, it is decen-
tralized as an ALPT equilibrium with ® = 0, and the equilibrium prices satisfy (4.12)
with ¯ = ^ ¯ > 0. On the other hand, for economies in which the Rothschild and Stiglitz
29separating candidate equilibrium is not incentive e¢cient, an ALPT equilibrium with
® = 0 does not exist (see footnote 9), but the sequence of ALPT equilibria allocations
converges, as ® ! 0, to x, the allocation with the minimum level of subsidization from
agents of type g to agents of type b, and equilibrium prices in the limit satisfy (4.12)
with ^ ¯ = 0.
Using such acharacterization of ALPT equilibria with ® = 0, it is nowstraightforward
to extend the second welfare theorem obtained for EPT equilibria, Proposition 4, to
ALPT equilibria: any incentive e¢cient consumption allocation can be decentralized as
an ALPT equilibrium with ® = 0 and with transfers (possibly dependent on the state
but not the agents’ type).
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 1, for any incentive e¢cient consumption allocation











0; and such that (xb;xg) is an ALPT equilibrium allocation, with ® = 0; for the economy
under consideration when each agent receives a transfer (tH;tL):
It is an interesting open question whether a stronger version of the second welfare
theorem, one which holds for any ® 2 [0;1], can be proved for the class of economies we
study in this paper.
Proof. Let (xb;xg) be any incentive e¢cient allocation. By Proposition 4, there exists
a set of feasible transfers (tH;tL) such that (xb;xg) is an EPT equilibrium allocation for
the economy with endowments !0 := (!L + tL;!H + tH). Moreover, by Proposition 2,
the economy with endowments !0 has a unique EPT equilibrium, i.e. (xb;xg); which is
the Rothschild and Stiglitz separating candidate equilibrium for that economy. Since
(xb;xg) is incentive e¢cient, from Proposition 7 it follows that it can be decentralized as
an ALPT equilibrium with ® = 0 of the economy with endowments !0.
5. Conclusions
We have studied in this paper the existence and welfare properties of competitive equilib-
ria of economies with adverse selection. In particular we have shown that, when exclusive
contracts are available, an appropriate structure of markets (for menus of contracts or,
equivalently, for consumption rights) allows to ’resolve’ the problem of decentralizing
incentive e¢cient allocations as all competitive (ALPT) equilibrium allocations are in-
centive e¢cient in this case. We have also shown that when such markets for menus
of contracts (or consumption rights) are not available, the (unique) competitive (EPT)
equilibrium allocation is not incentive e¢cient, for an open set of economies(and coin-
cides with the Rotschild and Stiglitz separating candidate equilibrium allocation).
Our results have been derived for a class of simple insurance economies with adverse
selection where agents can be of two possible types, and the - privately observed - type
30of each agent only concerns the probability structure of the idiosyncratic shocks a¤ecting
the agent. The analysis of markets and equilibria for such economies constitute a basic
workhorse for the economics of uncertainty, at least since the work by Rotschild and
Stiglitz (1976).
The equilibrium concepts we introduced can be extended to more general classes
of economies with adverse selection. A generalization of the results we obtained poses
however some technical problems. The main di¢culty, as we saw in this paper, arises
from the interaction between the non-convexities induced by the presence of the incentive
compatibility constraints in the consumption set and the feasibility requirement that,
even though a large economy is considered and the Law of Large Number can be used
to obtain the value of aggregate demand, markets for consumption rights have to clear
’exactly’ and not simply ’on average’: i.e., if agents of the same time make di¤erent
choices atequilibrium, all other types have to make exactly the same choice. While for the
special structure of the economies studied in this paper we have been able to circumvent
such problem by showing that over a relevant subset of the price domain agents’optimal
choice is unique and hence to restrict attention to deterministic allocations, this property
hardly generalizes. For more general economies with adverse selection, we may have so to
expand the commodity space so as to include lotteries over the underlying consumption
space, and to deal at the same time with the stronger feasibility requirement in our
framework (as at equilibrium all types have to choose exactly the same lottery).
31Appendix
A Characterization of Incentive E¢cient Allocations
(with Giuseppe Lopomo - Stern School, NYU)
We prove here Proposition 1, which provides a complete characterization of incentive
constrained optimal allocations for the economy under consideration. The argument
follows, with some minor modi…cations, the one in Prescott and Townsend (1984), and
is presented here for completeness.
We show …rst that even if (ex post) lotteries over consumption bundles are allowed,
such randomization is never optimal, as the solutions of the maximization of the agents’
welfare subject to the resource feasibility and the incentive compatibility constraints
always obtain at degenerate lotteries. The commodity space is expanded as in Lemma




[¢(XM)]4.17 As before, we endow [¢(XM)] with the weak* topology and [¢(XM)]4 with
the product topology.
Incentive e¢cient allocations are then the solutions of the following problem, for all
(°i)i2fg;bg 2 R2












































































The utility possibility set is then the set of pairs of utility levels for each type attain-
able at an incentive e¢cient allocation.
Lemma A. 1. For any °b 2 [0;1]; there is a unique solution of problem (5.1), given by
a degenerate lottery (i.e., ¹i
s has all the mass concentrated on a single value x 2 XM; for
all i;s) and the utility possibility set is convex.
17Compactness of the commodity space over which lotteries are de…ned is required for technical
reasons. Given this, the result obtained in Lemma A.1 below implies that the particular choice we made
for such commodity space (XM) is without loss of generality.
32Proof. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, we see that problem (5.1)
is a convex programming problem, and has a solution for all °b 2 [0;1]: The …rst order
conditions of problem (5.1), say with respect to ¹b













dh(x) = 0 (A.2)
for any h(x) such that
R
XM dh(x) = 0 and ¹b
L(x) + h(x) ¸ 0; where ¸
g;¸
b;½ are the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the two incentive constraints and the resource fea-











b > 0;(5.1) has at most a unique solution in x. As a consequence at any
incentive constrained optimum, ¹b
L(x) has all its mass concentrated on the only value of
x 2 XM such that equation (4.17) is satis…ed.
A similar argument holds for ¹b
H(x);¹g
s(x), s 2 fH;Lg.
The convexity of the problemthen implies that the solution of problem (5.1) is unique,
for all °b 2 [0;1] and that the utility possibility set is convex.













































































Let us denote still by ½, ¸
b, and ¸
g the Lagrange multipliers associated to the above
constraints.
It is convenient to distinguish the solutions of problem (5.1) according to the values
of ¸
b and ¸
g; there are four possible cases:
Case 1: ¸
b > 0, ¸
g > 0: This case is not possible. In fact, ¸
b > 0, ¸
g > 0 requires, by the






















































s; s 2 fH;Lg (A.8)
Substituting (A.8) into the …rst order conditions of problem (5.1), after some algebra,
we get a contradiction to the fact that both ¸
b and ¸
g are strictly positive.
Case 2: ¸
b = ¸

















































H. But then the incentive compati-






H = ^ x; at such value
the above system is only satis…ed for °b = »
b.18
Case 3: ¸
b > 0 and ¸
g = 0: In this case, the …rst order conditions of problem (5.1)
become:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :















































together with (A:5) ¡ (A:7): From the …rst two conditions of (A:9) we obtain xb
L =
xb
H := xb; moreover, since ¸





H; as ¼b < ¼g implies ¼b
¼g > 1¡¼b
1¡¼g. Since (xi
s)i;s = ^ x was shown to be the
solution of problem (5.1) for °b = »
b, the allocations we obtain as solutions of system
(A:9) and of (A:5) ¡ (A:7) where xb < ^ x, can only be solutions of that problem for
°b < »
b.
It is convenient to parameterize the solutions of (A:5) ¡ (A:7);(A:9) with respect to
x;¸





s2fH;Lg describe, in particular,











H = ^ x is also …rst best e¢cient.
34Observe that for xb = ^ x we get °b(xb) = »
b;xi
s(xb) = xb: Thus the set of incentive
constrained optima for which ¸
b > 0 and ¸
g = 0 is non-empty if we can show that the
utility of the g types along the solutions of (A:5)¡(A:7);(A:9) increases when we lower
xb below ^ x, or:
dUg(xb)
dxb jxb=^ x < 0 (A.10)
We will now show that (A:10) indeed holds. Substituting xb for xb
L;xb
H; equations




H; applying then the Implicit Function Theorem
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(¼g (1 ¡ ¼b) u0 (x
g
L) ¡ ¼b (1 ¡ ¼g)u0 (x
g
H))
The denominator of this expression is always positive, since ¼g ¡
1 ¡ ¼b¢
> ¼b (1 ¡ ¼g) and
u0 (x
g
L) > u0 (x
g





is negative.[CHECK IF OK!!!].
By Lemma A.1, the utility possibility set is convex and hence so is the set of incentive
e¢cient allocations for Case 3. From the above result it then follows that there exists




s2fH;Lg constitutes a solution of problem (5.1) for some 0 < °b < »
b, i.e., is




































and (A:5);(A:6) (i.e. such that
dUg(xb)
dxb = 0, resource feasibility and incentive compati-
bility for the type b are satis…ed).
Case 4: ¸
b = 0 and ¸































H := xg. As in the previous case, it is easy to show that xg < ^ x. Also,
































L, since ¼b < ¼g.
Since, as we showed, xg
s = ^ x; 2 fH;Lg is optimal for °b = »
b, and the allocations we
obtain from the solution of the …rst order conditions in Case 4 have the property that
xg
s < ^ x, s 2 fH;Lg; it follows that such allocations can only be incentive e¢cient for
°b > »
b.
The rest of the analysis in this case is perfectly symmetric to the one followed for
Case 3, and is hence omitted.
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